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1Security Optimization of Exposure Region-based
Beamforming with a Uniform Circular Array
Yuanrui Zhang, Roger Woods, Senior Member, IEEE, Youngwook Ko, Alan Marshall, Senior Member, IEEE,
and Junqing Zhang
Abstract—This paper investigates the impact of a uniform
circular array (UCA) in the context of wireless security via
exposure region (ER)-based beamforming. An improvement is
demonstrated for the security metric proposed in our previous
work, namely, the spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP), by
optimizing the configuration of the UCA. Our previous work
focused on formalizing the SSOP concept and exploring its
applicability using a uniform linear array example. This paper
proposes the UCA as a superior candidate because it is more
robust against the effects of mutual coupling. The UCA’s SSOP
configuration is explored and a special expression is derived
from the general expression for the first time, and a closed-
form upper bound is then generated to facilitate analysis. By
carefully designing the UCA structure particularly the radius,
an SSOP optimization algorithm is derived and explored for
mutual coupling. It is shown that the information leakage to
eavesdroppers is reduced while the legitimate user’s received
signal quality is enhanced due to the use of beamforming.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, beamforming, exposure
region, spatial secrecy outage probability, uniform circular array.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication is vulnerable to passive eaves-
dropping due to its broadcast nature. Physical layer security
exploits the unique and unpredictable features of wireless
channels such as fading and has shown a great potential to
secure future wireless technologies [1], [2]. This technique
dates back to Wyner’s seminal work on the wiretap channel
model [3], which has triggered much fruitful research and
has been extended to various channel models, such as fading
channels and multiple antenna channels [4]–[7].
In the physical layer security scenario with legitimate users
wishing to carry out secure communication with eavesdroppers
observing the transmissions, the channel of the legitimate user
in Wyner’s wiretap channel model is required to be better than
that of the eavesdroppers, at least for a fraction of realizations
in the case of fading channels [4]. When the legitimate
transmitter is equipped with multiple antennas or an antenna
array, beamforming is an effective technique to enlarge the
difference of the legitimate users’ and eavesdroppers’ channel
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Fig. 1. The enclosed area surrounding Bob illustrates the ER created using
a circular antenna array
quality and can be achieved by exploiting the channel state
information (CSI) [8] or the location information [9].
Beamforming can be used to create physical regions within
which any user can correctly receive the message [10]–
[13]; the area was defined as an ‘exposure region’ (ER)
in [10]. However, these regions were not based on information-
theoretic parameters, such as secrecy capacity or secrecy
outage probability (SOP) [4], and thus lacked a quantitative
measure of the security level. On the other hand, some
information theoretical based methods lacked of the analysis
from a physical perspective, for example, the aspect of antenna
arrays [14]–[18].
In our previous work [19], we proposed an ER-based beam-
forming approach which led to the derivation of the spatial se-
crecy outage probability (SSOP) from an information-theoretic
perspective and links with the antenna array configuration.
Fig. 1 illustrates a transmitter (Alice) with an antenna array
that communicates to a legitimate user (Bob) in the presence of
eavesdroppers (Eves) with their location distribution following
a Poisson point process (PPP); this hints towards the utilization
of location in the Wyner’s channel model. The ER is defined
by the physical region where any PPP distributed Eve causes
secrecy outage to the legitimate transmission in the Rician
fading channel. In [19], the secrecy outage caused by PPP
distributed Eves is quantitatively measured by the SSOP that
is derived from the ER. The general expression of the SSOP
for any type of array is derived and the uniform linear array
(ULA) is used as an example to explore the properties of the
array parameters.
Based on the knowledge of the previous work, we advance
knowledge in this paper by optimizing the array parameters.
The uniform circular array (UCA) is chosen rather than
the ULA because of practical considerations, namely mutual
coupling. Mutual coupling is the electromagnetic interaction
between the antenna elements of an array and is always
2associated with multiple antenna techniques [20], [21]. In [22],
it has been shown that linear arrays are susceptible to mutual
coupling, thus rendering no effective optimum solution for
minimizing the SSOP. On the other hand, the UCA is less
affected and produces a more symmetric beam pattern around
360◦ [23]. Thus, it is chosen as the candidate to exhibit the
optimization of the array parameters, especially the radius.
We assume that Bob’s location information is available at
Alice, which is similar to that used in [9]. For example,
Bob could send his own location information to Alice, if
he wishes to be served by Alice with additional security
features. Alice exploits Bob’s location information to perform
the beamforming.
In fading channels, the security performance of the afore-
mentioned system, i.e., Alice using beamforming to enlarge
the difference between Bob’s and Eves’ channels, can be
expressed in terms of secrecy outage. In [24], the secrecy
outage probability (SOP) for a single Eve is given by the
probability that Eve’s channel capacity is higher than a certain
threshold; this is defined by the difference between the rate
of the transmitted codewords and that of the confidential
information, conditioned on Bob’s channel capacity being
larger than the rate of the transmitted codewords. In other
words, the ER is an enclosed area within the boundary where
Eve’s channel capacity is just equal to that threshold. As Eve’s
channel capacity is random due to fading, the boundary of the
ER shifts. In Fig. 1, the dashed curve depicts an ER boundary
for a deterministic channel, which resembles the shape of the
array pattern.
Intuitively, the smaller the ER is, the less possible that
Eves are located inside the ER, and therefore the more secure
the transmission will be. The overall secrecy outage caused
by PPP distributed Eves, i.e., SSOP, is calculated with the
aid of stochastic geometry theory, which links the security
performance with the UCA parameters. This paper builds
substantially on our previous work [19], [25] by investigating
the SSOP with respect to UCA parameters in Rician fading
channel and creating an optimization algorithm which min-
imizes the SSOP by adjusting the radius. In addition, the
impact of mutual coupling is examined on the SSOP using
a numerical simulation tool, i.e., NEC [26]. In essence, this
sets the scene for setting secure regions in wireless networks.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• Deriving the expression of the SSOP for the UCA and
the closed-form expression of its upper bound for the first
time, thus revealing the relationship between the security
performance and various parameters, especially the radius
of the UCA.
• Based on the expressions of the SSOP for the UCA,
the first investigation of the security performance of ER-
based beamforming for a Rician fading channel with
respect to radius is presented. Simulation and numerical
results are covered, which show how the behavior of
averaged SSOP varies with the radius.
• An optimization algorithm is derived based on the above
analysis, which enhances the security level by optimizing
the radius for all of Bob’s possible angles. The impact of
the mutual coupling with the radius is compared with
the optimization algorithm and shows that while the
algorithm in general is valid, the optimum value needs
to be calculated using numerical data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model is introduced and the definitions of the ER
and the SSOP are presented. In Section III, the closed-form
expression of the upper bound is derived and from this the
impact of the radius of the UCA is analyzed. In Section IV, the
optimization problem is established and analyzed with respect
to the UCA array parameters; an algorithm is then created with
the aim of decreasing the SSOP. In Section V, simulation and
numerical results are given. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. EXPOSURE REGION AND SPATIAL SECRECY OUTAGE
PROBABILITY
A. System Model
As the paper builds on [19], the system model is the same
except for the UCA aspect. For this reason, the essential
symbols, concepts and derivations for the UCA are described
briefly to avoid repetition. Let’s assume that Alice is equipped
with an antenna array while Bob and Eves have a single
antenna. As shown in Fig. 1, Alice is located at the origin
point. For convenience, assume that the first element of the
UCA is on the positive x-axis. The coordinate is denoted by
z = (d, θ), and subscripts B and Ei are used to represent
Bob and the ith Eve respectively, ∀i ∈ N+. A general user’s
location is referred to by z when no subscript is specified.
Eves are assumed to be non-colluding and distributed by a
homogeneous PPP, Φe with density λe [27].
On the transmitter side, the UCA has N elements
and radius R, and the array vector of UCA is s(θ) =
[e−jφ1(θ), ..., e−jφi(θ), ..., e−jφN (θ)]T , θ ∈ [0, 2pi], where
φi(θ) = kR cos(θ − ψi), and ψi = 2pi(i − 1)/N is the
angular location of the ith element [28] and k = 2pi/λ,
where λ is the wavelength of the carrier signal. Pt is the
transmit power. Given Bob’s location information, θB , the
beamforming weight vector can be set as w = s(θB)/
√
N .
Assume a Rician channel with factor K. The channel gain
vector is given by
h(z) = d−β/2
(√ K
K + 1
s(θ) +
√
1
K + 1
g
)
, (1)
where d−β/2 denotes the large-scale path loss with the
path loss exponent β of typical values between 2 and 6.
The line-of-sight (LOS) component is
√
K
K+1s(θ); the non-
LOS component is
√
1
K+1g, where g = [g1, ..., gi, ..., gN ]
T ,
gi ∼ CN (0, 1), and the elements of g are independent.
Thus, the received signal at z is the sum of the beamform-
ing weighted signals and noise, which can be expressed by
r(z) =
√
Pth
T (z)w∗x + nW , where x is the modulated
symbol with unit power and nW is the additive white Gaussian
noise with zero mean and variance σ2n.
For the ease of subsequent mathematical derivations, let h˜
be an equivalent channel factor, i.e.,
h˜ = hT (z)w∗ =
√
K
K + 1
G(θ, θB) +
√
1
K + 1
g, (2)
3where G(θ, θB) = s(θ)s∗(θB)/
√
N is an array factor for any
array type and g ∼ CN (0, 1). According to (2), |h˜|2 can be
decomposed as follows:
|h˜|2 = KG
2(θ, θB)
K + 1
+
g2Re + g
2
Im
K + 1
+
2
√
KG(θ, θB)
K + 1
gRe,
(3)
where gRe and gIm are the real and imaginary part of g,
so, gRe, gIm ∼ N (0, 12 ). For the UCA, the array factor was
derived in [28] and is given by
G(θ, θB) =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
ejkR[cos(θB−ψi)−cos(θ−ψi)]. (4)
The channel capacity, denoted by C(z), is given by
C(z) = log2
(
1 +
Pt|h˜|2
σ2nd
β
)
. (5)
For convenience, let CB = C(zB) and CEi = C(zEi) denote
the channel capacities of Bob and the ith Eve hereinafter. Due
to the fact that |h˜|2 scales with G(θ, θB), a proper design of
G(θ, θB) can improve CB while decreasing CEi.
B. Definitions for ER and SSOP for UCA
As in [24], let RB and Rs be the rate of the transmitted
codewords and the rate of the confidential information, re-
spectively. A secrecy outage event occurs when Eve’s channel
capacity is higher than the difference RB−Rs conditioned on
CB ≥ RB , and the probability of such an event is the SOP.
Note that here two cases are differentiated, i.e., secrecy outage
caused by any Eve conditioned on CB ≥ RB and data outage
given by CB < RB . In the latter case, it is typical outage
with no secrecy and thus no secrecy outage. Therefore, the
data outage is not part of the secrecy outage and is beyond
the scope of this paper. In practice, Bob can transmit a one bit
feedback to Alice indicating whether the condition CB ≥ RB
is satisfied.
The ER, denoted by Θ, is defined by the geometric region
only where Eves cause the secrecy outage event, i.e., CEi >
RB −Rs,∃zEi ∈ Θ conditioned on CB ≥ RB . The boundary
of ER can be derived from C(z) > RB − Rs and is given
by D(θ) = (c0Pt|h˜|2)1/β , where c0 = [σ2n(2RB−RS − 1)]−1
is deterministic and is assumed to be constant in this paper.
Thus, D(θ) is random as |h˜|2 varies. When the channel is
deterministic, D(θ) is also deterministic, as shown by the
dashed curve in Fig. 1.
Let A denote the size of Θ. For PPP-distributed Eves, the
probability of m Eves being inside D(θ) can be given by [27]
Prob{m Eves in Θ} = (λeA)
m
m!
e−λeA. (6)
Thus, the SSOP, denoted by p, can be defined by the proba-
bility that any Eve is located inside D(θ).
p = 1− Prob{0 Eve in Θ} = 1− e−λeA. (7)
Note that p is computed by the complementary of the prob-
ability that no Eve is inside Θ. In polar coordinates, (7) can
be derived by
p = 1− exp
[
− λe
2
c
2
β
0 P
2
β
t
∫ 2pi
0
(|h˜|2) 2β dθ
]
. (8)
The smaller p is, the more secure the transmission to Bob is.
Due to the fact that h˜ is random channel fading, it is more
interesting to study the expectation of p in (8), which reflects
the averaged SSOP p¯,
p¯ = E|h˜|[p]. (9)
The term p¯ in (9) can be expressed by
p¯ =1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0 P
2
β
t
∫ 2pi
0
[KG2(θ, θB)
K + 1
+
x2 + y2
K + 1
+
2
√
KG(θ, θB)
K + 1
x
] 2
β
dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
pi
dx dy,
(10)
Notice that G(θ, θB) is a general array factor expression. For
the UCA, p and p¯ are obtained by substituting (4) into (8) and
(10).
C. An Optimization Problem
The focus of this paper is to increase the security level of
the transmission from Alice to Bob, i.e., reducing p¯. To this
end, p¯ is first analyzed against the factors in (10). Assume that
the noise variance σ2n, channel factors β and K, the security
related parameters RB and Rs and the density of Eves λe are
fixed. The remaining factors are the transmit power Pt, the
array factor G(θ, θB) and Bob’s location (dB , θB). Thus, an
optimization problem can be expressed by
min p¯ s.t. for all dB , θB (11)
To minimize p¯, the interrelationship between parameters
related to Alice, i.e., Pt and G(θ, θB), and Bob’s location
(dB , θB) should be analyzed. Note that dB does not appear in
(10) and Pt has a monotonic relationship with p¯. In addition,
the impact of Pt and G(θ, θB) on p¯ are independent according
to (10). In this paper, when studying the impact of G(θ, θB),
Pt and dB will be not be included.
G(θ, θB) in (4) depends on the array parameters N and
R as well as Bob’s angle θB . As the number of antennas N
is normally fixed for a certain UCA, the impact of R will
be mainly discussed against θB . Due to the reflection and
rotation symmetry of the UCA, the shape of G(θ, θB) also has
reflection and rotation symmetry regarding θB . An example of
G(θ, θB) with θB = 0, pi4 and N = 8 is shown in Fig. 2. As
the first element of the UCA lies on the positive x-axis, the
shape of G(θ, θB) for θB = pi4 can be obtained by shifting the
shape for θB = 0 by pi4 , and vice versa. At the same time, the
two shapes are symmetric regarding to θB = pi8 . In general,
G(θ, θB) at ±(θB ± 2pi/N) are of the same shape. Therefore,
it suffices to study G(θ, θB) only in θB ∈ [0, piN ] instead of
[0, 2pi].
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Fig. 2. G(θ, θB) for θB = 0 and θB = pi4 . N = 8 and R = 0.8λ.
The expression of p¯ in (10) is complex and can be calculated
numerically. However, it is not tractable to obtain in closed-
form expression, except for the deterministic channel when
β = 2. Therefore, an upper bound expression for p¯, denoted
by p¯up, should be derived in closed-form for UCA in order
to facilitate detailed theoretical analysis. Notice that for other
array types, the method of analyzing p¯ via closed-from ex-
pression of p¯up still works. If closed-form expressions of p¯up
do not exist, appropriate approximations or numerical results
can be used based on the particular form of given G(θ, θB).
III. CLOSED-FORM EXPRESSION FOR THE UPPER BOUND
FOR SSOP
A. Derivation of the Upper Bound for UCA
Firstly, a general upper bound is briefly introduced as
follows, based on which the particular upper bound for UCA
can be derived. For a given λe and K, p¯up can be derived
using Jensen’s inequality.
p¯up = 1− exp
{
− λepi
[
c0Pt
KA0 + 2pi
2pi(K + 1)
] 2
β
}
, (12)
where A0 denotes the pattern area and is given by,
A0 =
∫ 2pi
0
G2(θ, θB) dθ. (13)
The derivation is described in [19]. According to (12), p¯up is
monotonically increasing with A0 for any K and β. Therefore,
p¯up can be analyzed via A0.
Notice that the expression of A0 in (13) contains G(θ, θB)
which is a general expression. To obtain the particular ex-
pression for the UCA, the expression of A0 needs to be
determined. We can isolate θ to solve the integral in (4).
G2(θ, θB) =
1
N
∑
i,j
ejkR[cos(θB−ψi)−cos(θB−ψj)] (14)
·e−jkR[cos(θ−ψi)−cos(θ−ψj)],
where
∑
i,j represents
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 and cos(θ−ψi)−cos(θ−
ψj) can be further derived by
cos(θ − ψi)− cos(θ − ψj) (15)
=2 sin(θ − i+ j − 2
N
pi) sin(
i− j
N
pi).
Let Wi,j = 2 sin( i−jN pi) and Zi,j =
i+j−2
N pi. Substituting (15)
into (14), G2(θ, θB) can be derived as
1
N
∑
i,j
ejkRWi,j sin(θB−Zi,j) · e−jkRWi,j sin(θ−Zi,j). (16)
According to Jn(x) = 12pi
∫ pi
−pi e
j(nτ−x sin τ)dτ , where Jn(x) is
the Bessel function of the first kind with order n, the following
integration can be derived.∫ 2pi
0
e−jkRWi,j sin(θ−Zi,j) dθ
=
∫ 2pi−Zi,j
−Zi,j
ej[0·τ−kRWi,j sin τ ] d(τ + Zi,j)
=
∫ pi
−pi
ej[0·θ−kRWi,j sin τ ] dτ
=2piJ0(kRWi,j) (17)
Note that in the second step, the upper and lower limits can be
transformed to pi and −pi, because sin τ is a periodic function
with a period of 2pi.
Combining (16) and (17), A0 in (13) can be written as
A0 =
2pi
N
∑
i,j
J0(kRWi,j)e
jkRWi,j sin(θB−Zi,j). (18)
The double summation of Bessel functions in (18) is in-
tractable to analyze. In the following, A0 will be further
simplified. Let A0,i,j denote each summation term in (18),
A0,i,j =
2pi
N
J0(kRWi,j)e
jkRWi,j sin(θB−Zi,j). (19)
It is deduced that Wi,j = −Wj,i and Zi,j = Zj,i. Considering
that Jn(−x) = (−1)nJn(x) and J0(x) is a real number, it can
be deduced that A0,i,j = A∗0,j,i. In addition, it can be shown
from the expression of Wi,j and Zi,j that Wi,j+N = −Wi,j .
Similarly, sin(θB −Zi,j+N ) = − sin(θB −Zi,j). Thus, it can
be determined found that A0,i,j = A0,i,j+N .
A table of A0,i,j is shown in Fig. 3 to illustrate how to use
the previous properties to simplify the summation of A0 in
(18). For N = 4, the table is extended to j = 8. As A0,i,j =
A0,i,j+N , the blue region is equivalent to the green region.
Instead of adding Ai,j for i, j from 1 to N , the summation
can now be executed diagonally. For convenience, let n = i−j.
Then, Wn = Wi,j = 2 sin( nN pi). The terms A0,i,j on the red
diagonal lines in the table have the same Wn. In the table,
N
pi Zi,j is allocated according to their indices i and j. Given
n = i− j, it can be derived that
Zn,i = Zi,j =
i+ j − 2
N
pi =
2i− n− 2
N
pi. (20)
Thus, it can be derived that
A0,n,i = A0,i,j =
2pi
N
J0(kRWn)e
jkRWn sin(θB−Zn,i). (21)
5extened table: j > 4
2
,
 jiZ
N
ji
S
1 n 2 n 3 n0 n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0 1 2 31
1 2 3 4 52
2 3 4 5 6 73
3 4 5 6 7 8 94
jin  
j
i
Fig. 3. Table for Zi,j , N = 4.
A0 is the summation of all elements in the original table
(i.e., i, j = 1, ..., 4). Because A0,i,j+N = A0,i,j , the calcula-
tion of A0 can be executed by replacing the lower triangle in
the original table (i.e., i > j) with the lower triangle in the
extended table (i.e., i > j −N ). In the new formation of A0,
which is a parallelogram table, the summation can be carried
out along the diagonal lines from n = 0 to n = −(N − 1).
For any n, the summation of A0,n,i includes N terms with
Zn,i. Thus, (18) can be converted into
A0 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
A0,i,j =
−(N−1)∑
n=0
N∑
i=1
A0,n,i
=
−(N−1)∑
n=0
N∑
i=1
2pi
N
J0(kRWn)e
jkRWn sin(θB−Zn,i)
=
2pi
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
N∑
i=1
ejkRWn sin(θB−Zn,i). (22)
According to Jacobi-Anger expansion ejα sin γ =∑∞
m=−∞ Jm(α)e
jmγ , (22) can be further derived by
(23) at the top of the following page.
When m = lN , l ∈ Z, ejpimN (n+2) = ejlnpiej2pil = ejlnpi
and
N∑
i=1
e−j2pi
m
N i =
N∑
i=1
e−j2pili = N. (24)
When m 6= lN ,
N∑
i=1
e−j2pi
m
N i = e−j2pi
m
N
1− e−j2pimNN
1− e−j2pimN = 0. (25)
Thus, it can be derived that
A0 =
2pi
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
JlN (kRWn)e
jlNθBejlnpiN
= 2pi
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
JlN (kRWn)e
jlNθB (−1)ln
= 2pi
N−1∑
n=0
J0(−kRWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
(−1)−lnJlN (−kRWn)ejlNθB
= 2pi
N−1∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
(−1)ln+lNJlN (kRWn)ejlNθB .
(26)
Substituting (26) in (13), the closed-form expression for p¯up in
(12) can be obtained. Compared to (13), the expression of A0
in (26) consists of a finite summation of J0(·) and an infinite
summation of JlN (·), which can provide asymptotic analysis.
B. Impact of R on A0
As discussed in Section II-C, the impact of R will be used
as a starting point to formulate the optimization problem. In
the low region of x, the Bessel function JlN (x) in (26) is
negligible for high order lN , i.e., lN  1. Let x0 denote
the upper limit of the range x ∈ [0, x0] where JlN (x) is
negligible for certain lN . Then, the specific value x0 depends
on the order lN . As the order lN increases, x0 increases and
eventually exceeds the value of 2kR, which is the upper limit
of x = KRWn in (26) for a fixed R. Once x0 becomes larger
than 2kR, all JlN (x) for l ≥ 1 are negligible in the range
(0, 2kR]. Thus, for sufficiently large N , A0 in (26) can be
approximated by
A0 ≈ 2pi
N−1∑
n=0
J20 (kRWn). (27)
The asymptotic behavior of A0 versus R can be analyzed
through (27). As shown in the upper plot in Fig. 4, when
n = 0, J0(kRW0) = 1, because W0 = 0 and J0(0) is a
constant that is irrelevant to R. When n 6= 0, J0(kRWn)
gradually decreases with some fluctuation as R increases,
which is determined by the nature of J0(·). Notice that in the
asymptotic expression in (27), the angle θB is neglected. When
N is not large enough, the term JlN (kRWn)ejlNθB also needs
to be considered. As Jn(x) decreases and approaches zero
with different convergence speed, the summation of a series of
Bessel functions, i.e., A0, in general decreases and approaches
a certain value as R increases. Due to the difference in the
converging speed of JlN (kRWn), there are some fluctuations.
An example of A0 versus R is shown in the lower plot
in Fig. 4 where N = 8 and θB = 0◦. It can be seen
that A0 fluctuates as R increases, because the curve is a
superposition of JlN (kRWn) with different orders lN . Thus,
in a local region, e.g., R < 2λ, the minimum value does not
necessarily correspond to a large or small R, which leads to
the optimization problem for R.
IV. OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM
A. Refined Optimization Problem
As mentioned in Section III-B, R can be properly designed
according to θB to achieve a local minimum value in a certain
range of R. According to Section II-C, dB is not involved in
the expression of p¯. Thus, the optimization problem can be
solved by optimizing R according to θB .
It is worth noticing that although the closed-form expression
of p¯up provides an asymptotic analysis on the impact of R,
it does not provide accurate results for the optimum value for
R. As it is intractable to analyze the expression of p¯ in (10),
we will use numerical results to determine this.
Examples of p¯ versus R for different θB are shown in Fig. 5
where N = 8. For simplicity, let K →∞ and β = 2, i.e., the
6A0 =
2pi
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
N∑
i=1
∞∑
m=−∞
Jm(kRWn)e
jm(θB−Zn,i)
=
2pi
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
∞∑
m=−∞
Jm(kRWn)e
jmθB
N∑
i=1
e−jmZn,i
=
2pi
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
∞∑
m=−∞
Jm(kRWn)e
jmθBejpi
m
N (n+2)
N∑
i=1
e−j2pi
m
N i. (23)
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Fig. 4. Upper plot: Examples of J0(kRWn) versus R. Lower plot: A0 versus
R. N = 8, θB = 0◦.
channel is degraded to a free-space channel. More results for
Rician fading channel will be provided in Section V-A. For the
purpose of MATLAB simulation, the value of R is taken by
a step of 1 cm in the range [0.4λ, 2λ]. Typical values of θB ,
i.e., θB = 0◦, 10◦, 20◦, are taken for the UCA with N = 8.
Fig. 5 depicts the fluctuating behavior of p¯ with respect to R
for different values of θB . It can be seen that the curves for
different θB vary. Therefore, for each θB , the local minimum
of p¯ in the range R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ] is given by a different value
of R. This suggests that by varying θB , a different R should
be chosen in order to achieve a minimum p¯. However, this is
not practical because R is usually predefined for an existing
UCA.
Since R can only be a particular value, the optimum value
Ropt needs to pre-designed. To this end, the minimum mean
error is used to find Ropt in a certain range of R that produces
the minimum p¯ for all possible θB ∼ U(0, 2pi). To establish the
cost function, imagine that R is adjustable, which provides the
hypothetical function of p¯min with respect to θB . Notice that
the value of p¯min for each θB is, in fact, given by a different
value of R. To find Ropt, let the mean error, denoted by err(R),
be the mean value of the difference between p¯ and p¯min over
the range θB ∈ [0, 2pi],
err(R) = EθB [p¯− p¯min]. (28)
Note that the mean error is used instead of the mean square
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Fig. 5. p¯ versus R for different values of θB , N = 8, Pt/σ2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1× 10−4.
error because p¯− p¯min is always non-negative. Thus, Ropt can
be found by
Ropt = arg min
R
err(R). (29)
(29) can be converted into the following expression, the
derivation of which is in Appendix A.
Ropt = arg min
R
p¯, (30)
where p¯ is the averaged p¯ over Bob’s angles and is defined by
p¯ =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
p¯dθB . (31)
B. Analysis and Implementation of Optimization Algorithm
Substituting the expression of p¯ in (10) into (31), the
expression of p¯ can be obtained,
p¯ = 1− 1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ 2pi
0
exp
{
− λe
2
(c0Pt)
2
β∫ 2pi
0
[KG2C(θ, θB)
K + 1
+
x2 + y2
K + 1
+
2
√
KGC(θ, θB)
K + 1
x
] 2
β
dθ
}
e−(x
2+y2)
pi
dθB dxdy. (32)
Although (32) can be numerically calculated, it is intractable
to analyze. Thus, the upper bound, denoted by p¯up, is required
for theoretical analysis.
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Theorem 1:
p¯up = 1− exp
{
− λepi
[ c0KA¯0
2pi(K + 1)
+
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}
, (33)
where A¯0 is the expectation of A0 over θB and is given by
A¯0 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
A0 dθB = 2pi
N−1∑
n=0
J20 (kRWn). (34)
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix B. It can be seen
that (34) has a similar composition to A0 in (26). Therefore,
A¯0 in general decreases with some fluctuations as R increases.
Due to the monotonically increasing relationship between p¯up
and A¯0, it can be deduced that p¯ decreases in general with
some fluctuations as R increases.
Because p¯ fluctuates in a certain range of R, there must
exist at least one local minimum. Numerical results are used
to find Ropt in (30). For example, choosing N = 8 and R ∈
[0.4λ, 2λ], the results of p¯ shown in Fig. 6 are obtained where
the channel is chosen as a free-space channel. It can be seen
that there is more than one local minimum. In the range R ∈
[0.4λ, 2λ], Ropt = 1.76λ gives the minimum p¯ as 2.4× 10−3.
Compared to the maximum value of p¯ that is 3.6 × 10−3 in
the same range, there is a 33% reduction in the value of p¯.
This indicates that by choosing an appropriate value of R, the
averaged SSOP can be dramatically reduced.
The numerical implementation of the algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1. The continuous ranges of R, θB , θ are discretized
with steps of ∆R, ∆θB and ∆θ, respectively. In addition, a
limit value Q is used when calculating integral from −∞ to
∞ in (32). For a normal distribution, a realistic value is set
for Q, namely 3. Let NR, NθB , Nθ and NQ be the number of
samples for R, θB , θ and the integration range Q respectively,
which determines the iteration numbers.
There are two main steps in the optimization algorithm.
The first step is from line 3 to 15, where p¯ for a range of
discretized R is calculated. Notice that the integrals in (32)
are implemented via iterated summation from line 6 to 15. The
second step section is from line 16 to 21, where the minimum
Algorithm 1 Optimization of R for fixed N
INPUT: σ2n, β, K, RB , Rs, λe, λ, Pt, N
INPUT: R1, R2, ∆R; θB1, θB2, ∆θB ; θ1, θ2, ∆θ; Q, ∆Q
OUTPUT: Ropt
1: discretize R, θB , θ, Q
2: calculate NR, NθB , Nθ, NQ and c0
3: create an 1×NR empty vector of p¯ with index idx
4: for each value of R ∈ [R1, R2], θB ∈ [θB1, θB2] do
5: S1 = 0
6: for each value of x, y ∈ [−Q,Q] do
7: S2 = 0
8: for each value of θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] do
9: S2 = S2+
10:
[
KG2(θ,θB)+x
2+y2+2
√
KG(θ,θB)x
K+1
] 2
β
∆θ
11: end for
12: S1 = S1 + exp{−λe2 (Ptc0)
2
β S2} e−(x
2+y2)
pi ∆Q
2
13: end for
14: p¯(idx) = p¯(idx) + (1− S1)/NθB
15: end for
16: initialization: Ropt = R1, p¯min = p¯(1)
17: for each value of R ∈ [R1, R2] do
18: if p¯min > p¯(idx) then
19: reassignment: Ropt = R, p¯min = p¯(idx)
20: end if
21: end for
value p¯min in the vector p¯ is searched to find Ropt which is
the output of the optimization algorithm.
The accuracy of the result increases with number of sam-
ples; however, the compuational complexity also increases.
The running time of the numerical implementation is approx-
imately O(NRNθBN2QNθ). There is no specific restriction
on the sampling interval as long as the chosen resolution
generates a reasonable value.
V. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first provide simulation results for p¯ in
(10) and then numerical results for p¯ in (32) over the Rician
channel with a wider range of values of K and β. Next, the
numerical results of the upper bounds p¯up and p¯up are shown
in comparison with p¯ and p¯ to demonstrate the validity of the
upper bounds. In the end, we investigate a common problem
in antenna array, i.e., the mutual coupling and its effect on p¯.
A. More Results for Rician Fading Channels
In Section IV-B, numerical results are used to show the
properties of p¯ versus R. Firstly, the simulation results are
provided to validate the expressions of p¯ in (10) that is derived
from the expression in (9) which contains Gaussian random
variables via |h˜2| according to (3). We choose K = 10 and
β = 3 as an example to compare the numerical results based
on the expression in (10) and the simulation results based
on the expression in (9). We ran Monte Carlo simulations to
generate 1 × 104 samples of gRe and gIm in (3). As stated
in Section II-C, the noise variance σ2n, channel factors β and
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Fig. 7. Simulation and numerical results for p¯ versus R; K = 10, β = 3,
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K, the security related parameters RB and Rs and the density
of Eves λe are assumed to be constant; the transmit power
Pt does not affect the impact of the array parameters to the
SSOP. In this section, Pt and σ2n are set to −65 dBm and
−80 dBm, respectively. The rate of the transmitted codewords
RB is set to 3.4594 bps/Hz which corresponds to a received
SNR of 10 dB for Bob. The rate of the confidential information
Rs is set to be smaller than RB , e.g., 1 bps/Hz as used in [18].
The density of Eves is set to 1×10−4 which means 100 Eves
in 1000 × 1000 m2. Finally, the radius of the UCA is set
to [0.4λ, 2λ], which corresponds to [5, 25] cm for 2.4 GHz
frequency. For comparison, a commercial uniform circular
array FCI-3710 developed by Fidelity Comtech has 15.24 cm
radius [29]. The simulation and numerical results plotted in
Fig. 7 show a good match between them, which verifies the
validity of the expressions in (10).
Secondly, a wider range of K and β for Rician channel
will be examined. We choose typical value of β = 3, 5 and
K = 1, 10. The results of p¯ is calculated according to (32). As
shown in Fig. 8, all curves exhibit similar trend with regard to
R to the curve in Fig. 6 where K →∞ and β = 2. In addition,
for both curves in Fig. 8, the optimum value Ropt in the range
R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ] is 1.76λ. It means that the optimum value of
R in a certain range is valid for Rician channels with different
K and β.
B. Numerical Results of the Upper Bounds
Next, closed-form expressions of p¯up and p¯up are derived
in Section III-A and Section IV-B, respectively, in order to
facilitate analysis. Here, some numerical results are shown to
demonstrate that the upper bounds can reflect the fluctuating
behavior of p¯ and p¯ against R.
In Fig. 9, the results for p¯ and p¯up versus R are shown for
typical values of β = 3 and K = 1, 10. It can be seen that
the curves of p¯up have a similar shape to the curves of p¯, and
the value of p¯up is close to p¯up. This suggests that the upper
bound can very well reflect the property of p¯.
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Fig. 9. Numerical results for p¯ and p¯up versus R; β = 3, Pt/σ2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1× 10−4.
In Fig. 10, the results for p¯ and p¯up versus R are shown for
typical values of β = 3 and K = 1, 10. It can be seen that the
curves for p¯ and p¯up have a similar shape, and the values of
p¯ and p¯up are close to each other, which means that p¯up is a
good upper bound.
C. Impact of Mutual Coupling
The mutual coupling is caused by energy absorption be-
tween proximate antennas and causes distortion to the array
factor G(θ, θB), and thus affects p¯ and the optimization
algorithm. In this paper, we choose the NEC tool [26] to build
a numerical model as an example to examine the impact of
the mutual coupling, although any analytical model will apply.
The NEC tool serves as a numerical method to calculate array
patterns that include the mutual coupling effect, and its results
are well accepted in the literature [30], [31].
An example shown in Fig. 11 illustrates the difference
caused by the mutual coupling for system configurations with
N = 8, R = 0.8λ, θB = 0◦. The array pattern with the mutual
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Fig. 11. Example of theoretical and NEC simulated patterns, N = 8, R =
0.8λ, θB = 0◦.
coupling is calculated by the NEC simulation. It can be seen
that there is not much difference in the main beam, but with
deviation in the sidelobes.
To measure the array pattern distortion caused by the mutual
coupling, Pearson’s correlation coefficient, denoted by ρ, is
adopted. It measures the correlation between two variables X
and Y , as defined by
ρ =
cov(X,Y )
std(X) · std(Y ) , (35)
where cov(·, ·) stands for the covariance and std(·) the stan-
dard deviation. ρ between the theoretical array pattern and
the simulated array pattern via NEC tool can be calculated to
quantify their similarity. The larger ρ is, the more alike two
patterns are.
The patterns of the UCA with a range of radius are
simulated in NEC. For N = 8, typical values are chosen,
i.e., θB = 0◦, 10◦, 20◦ in the range R = [0.4λ, 2λ]. The
correlation coefficient, ρ, between the theoretical and NEC
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Fig. 12. Correlation coefficients between theoretical and NEC simulated
patterns, N = 8, Pt/σ2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz,
λe = 1× 10−4.
patterns is calculated and the results are shown in Fig. 12.
It can be seen that ρ is generally above 0.8 in the range of
R = [0.4λ, 2λ], except for R = 0.48λ. This shows that the
mutual coupling does not cause a significant distortion to the
pattern of UCA. The high correlation between the theoretical
and NEC patterns indicates that the optimization algorithm,
which is based on empirical results on the theoretical patterns,
can still work when considering the mutual coupling.
On the other hand, there exists some differences between the
theoretical and NEC patterns, which means that when calculat-
ing Ropt in the numerical implementation of the optimization
algorithm, the NEC simulation data instead of the theoretical
data should be used. To compare with Fig. 5, the same array
parameters are adopted, i.e., N = 8 and R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ],
and p¯ with the mutual coupling is calculated based on the
NEC simulation data. The results are shown in the upper
plot in Fig. 13. Compared to Fig. 5, it is not hard to notice
the similarity between the theoretical and NEC simulated
curves for the same θB , which can be explained by the high
correlation between them, as shown in Fig. 12.
Because of the differences between the theoretical and NEC
simulated results, p¯ in Fig. 6 needs to be re-calculated based
on the NEC simulation data, in order to find Ropt. The lower
plot in Fig. 13 shows p¯ based on the NEC simulation data
in comparison with the theoretical curve. It can be seen that
the optimum value for the NEC simulation data is Ropt =
1.6λ compared to Ropt = 1.76λ for the theoretical result. By
choosing Ropt = 1.6λ, the value of p¯ is reduced dramatically
by about 59% compared to the maximum value of p¯ at R =
0.4λ.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the security performance of ER-
based beamforming system with the UCA in the presence of
PPP distributed Eves in Rician fading channel. With the aid
of the expression of the averaged SSOP and the closed-form
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expression of its upper bound, an optimization algorithm with
regard to the radius was developed to minimize the SSOP.
This paper provides a mathematical relationship which allows
the radius to be optimized for a given UCA with a certain
number of elements. The optimization algorithm is still valid
for mutual coupling in practice, however, the optimum value
needs to be calculated based on the NEC simulation data. In
this work, it is assumed that Bob’s location is known by Alice
beforehand. In practice, there could be inaccuracy in Bob’s
location information at Alice, whether Bob sends his location
to Alice or Alice estimates Bob’s location. In future work,
it can be extended to include the impact of error in Bob’s
location when optimizing the array parameters in practice. We
will also extend our work considering random locations of
Bob.
APPENDIX A
CONVERSION OF OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Because θB ∼ U(0, 2pi), err(R) can be calculated by
err(R) =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
(p¯− p¯min) dθB . (36)
To find the minimum value of err(R), the zeros of the partial
derivative of err(R) with respect to R are calculated,
∂
∂R
err(R) = 0 (37)
⇒ ∂
∂R
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
(p¯− p¯min) dθB = 0 (38)
⇒ 1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
(
∂
∂R
p¯− ∂
∂R
p¯min) dθB = 0. (39)
Because p¯min is a fixed value for certain θB and only depends
on θB , the partial derivative ∂∂R p¯min = 0. Thus, it can be
derived that
∂
∂R
err(R) = 0 (40)
⇒ 1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
∂
∂R
p¯ dθB = 0 (41)
⇒ ∂
∂R
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
p¯ dθB = 0 (42)
⇒ ∂
∂R
p¯ = 0, (43)
where p¯ is the averaged SSOP over Bob’s angle and is defined
by
p¯ =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
p¯dθB . (44)
Thus, we can obtain
Ropt = arg min
R
p¯. (45)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To obtain the upper bound p¯up, two instances of Jensen’s
inequality will be used to derive p¯up.
E[eX ] ≥ eE[X], (46)
where X is a random variable. The equality holds if and only if
X is a deterministic value. The other one involved is expressed
by
E[X
2
β ] ≤ (E[X]) 2β , (47)
where X is a random variable and β ≥ 2. The equality holds
when β = 2 for any X .
The upper bound p¯up can be derived based on p¯ ≤ p¯up.
Using (12), it can be derived that
p¯ = EθB [p¯] ≤ EθB [p¯up]
= 1− EθB
[
exp
{
− λepi
[ c0K
2pi(K + 1)
A0 +
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}]
.
(48)
Using (46) and (47), it can be derived that
1− EθB
[
exp
{
− λepi
[ c0K
2pi(K + 1)
A0 +
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}]
(49)
<1− exp
{
− λepiEθB
[[ c0K
2pi(K + 1)
A0 +
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
]}
(50)
≤1− exp
{
− λepi
[ c0K
2pi(K + 1)
EθB [A0] +
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}
. (51)
The equality in (50) does not hold because θB is random in
this case. Then, p¯up can be obtained by
p¯up = 1− exp
{
− λepi
[ c0KA¯0
2pi(K + 1)
+
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}
, (52)
where A¯0 is the expectation of A0 over θB and is given by
A¯0 = EθB [A0] =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
A0 dθB . (53)
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The above equation can be calculated from (26) by directly
solving the integral. Because∫ 2pi
0
ejlNθB dθB = 0, for l 6= 0 (54)
it can be obtained that
A¯0 = 2pi
N−1∑
n=0
J20 (2kR sin(
n
N
pi)). (55)
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